Between Consenting Adults

Written by Scott Pruett

Over the past month or so I've happened to stumble across an interesting collection of news stories. They are interesting both because of their remarkable nature and because they have a common theme. That theme concerns the legal and moral mischief "consenting adults" can manage to get themselves into. I’d like to explore this in relation to those who are most vocal in their use of the language of "consent."

"What consenting adults do in private is no one else's business"

I hear this defense used relentlessly to justify homosexuality, as though it is some kind of a slam-dunk moral qualifier for personal behavior. It has a certain surface-level force to it, but it suggests a rather broader application than I am sure is intended. If "gay rights" activists want us to take this defense seriously, and not just as a verbal shrug to opposition, then an examination of this claim ought to hold up to scrutiny.

In the world of philosophy, there is a legitimate tactic that is employed to refute an idea on the basis of its radical implications and lack of social feasibility. Its formal name is "reductio ad absurdum," and it is basically the process of working an idea out to its unpleasant logical conclusion. This is generally done by giving either real or extreme theoretical examples of the idea in order to demonstrate the absurdities that can logically follow from its application. For example, there is a (no doubt apocryphal) story about a fellow who saw a bumper sticker on the car in front of him advising that "If it feels good, do it." Being duly annoyed by the shallow sentiment, he gave his car a little gas and bumped the guy. When the driver got out and asked, "Why’d you do that!?" he simply said, "It felt good!"

Applying the argument

Now, dreaming up examples of unadvisable things that consenting adults could do may be an easy task; however, if you turned such fictional examples back on the "consent" advocate, they may likely claim that these are just ridiculous and improbable. Well, probability is not really relevant here; it is the logical implications that we are concerned with. But we don't even have to argue the point; there are plenty of real-life examples to pull from. This is where my news stories come into the discussion.

For example, let us take the case of Gerald Krien of Klamath Falls, Oregon, who made a "suicide pact" with dozens of internet users. It was to be executed en mass on Valentines Day, but not before police caught wind and put a stop to it with Mr. Krien's arrest.

Or Sharon Lopatka of Hampstead, Maryland, who was in the habit of going into chat rooms and asking to be "tortured to death." She eventually found an accomplice willing to take her fantasy beyond cyberspace role-play and into real life. After getting her affairs in order she happily departed and consummated her fantasy. The explanatory note left for her husband speaks volumes about her "consent" including such statements as, "I will not be returning," and, "don't go after my killer," and, "If my body is never retrieved, don’t worry: know that I’m at peace."

Or Adriana Iliescu of Romania, who, through the assistance of her physician, managed to have a child at the age of 66. Never mind that she is a single, retired woman of limited means, or that two children were sacrificed in the process (one miscarried and the other stillborn), or that the surviving child will either be without a mother by high school or will likely assume the caregiver role, or that Romania is notorious for its sizable orphan population.

Then there are the amputee "wannabes" who claim that their arms or legs are so alien to them that they conspire to be rid of them in various creative ways, with doctor assistance in some cases. One wannabe froze his leg in dry ice until it was irreversibly damaged, then persuaded a surgeon to complete the job. When he awoke from the anesthetic and his left leg was gone, he said, "All my torment has disappeared."

But most disturbing of all is Armin Meiwes of Cologne, Germany, who advertised on the internet for a "well-built male prepared to be slaughtered and then consumed." After finding several interested parties he selected one and did just that.

Even though there is general agreement that these cases should be legally pursued, the consent and personal rights mentality is so prevalent in modern society that legal and health officials seem to be at odds over how to handle them. As Meiwes argues, "It isn't as if I killed anyone against their will." One BBC correspondent observed regarding Meiwes that "legally, it is a tricky case," especially since the victim volunteered and cannibalism is not a recognized offense under German law. In the end, the courts were so influenced by the "consent" argument that they were unable to deliver a murder charge in the case. Manslaughter would have to do, and we are probably fortunate even for that much.

These examples may seem clearly outrageous to us, but if the "consent" argument holds, we have nothing to say about such behaviors; our own revulsion is a matter of personal distaste, on par with eating squid or lima beans, which some enjoy. The better question is: what ought we to think about people mutilating, killing, or cannibalizing others or themselves? Does consent make any difference or are these the kinds of behaviors that we generally ought not to encourage, much less celebrate?

One philosopher illustrates my point this way: how would we react if we heard that a girl had been gang raped in the back of a school bus? Surely we would be outraged. But what if we then learned that she had consented to the act? Of course, it is no longer "rape," but does this sanctify the act itself, or should we continue to believe that young ladies ought not be treated like this?

"As long as no one’s being hurt"

Homosexuals may object that they are not advocates for these absurd things, but it is naïve to assume that ideas do not have consequences. Our judicial system is driven by the fuel of legal principle and precedence.

To escape the implications, homosexual rights advocates often add the qualifier of "no harm" to that of "consent." We can heartily agree with them that there are more factors that should be considered in the equation, but as soon as we begin adding qualifiers, we are required to look more closely at what the homosexual lifestyle entails, and this is where things go badly for them.

For example, in the case of the "harm" qualifier it would certainly rule out the frightening examples that I have given above, but we can't be too hasty in exempting homosexuality. First we must define "harm," and in doing so it seems reasonable to look beyond the idea of immediate physical damage or fatality. If we extend this to include long-term health risks (as we do when condemning smoking), or psycho-emotional problems (as with incest or overexposure to violent media), or social ramifications (as with legalized drugs or prostitution), then we will find the homosexual advocate in a difficult defensive position.

We don’t have to look far to find data on the health problems intrinsic to the homosexual lifestyle, or psychological conditions prevalent among the homosexual community, or deep socio-economic changes that will result from normalizing homosexuality. My point here is not to prove these harmful effects, but to point out that such things must be considered when going beyond the "consent" façade. Even so, there is indeed much fuel for concern here.

Conclusion

The "consent" argument used by homosexuals can also apply to a host of deviant and deadly personal behaviors. Every suicide, every drug deal, every extra-marital affair is among "consenting adults" (to name just a few mundane examples). Are these things healthy? Are they for the good of society? Do we want to affirm these as legitimate and benign choices? I don’t think so.

It seems clear that the "consent" argument is, at best, incomplete as a moral qualifier. If homosexuals seriously want to justify their lifestyle, they are going to have to address the legitimacy of the behavior itself, not simply appeal to some flawed justification for engaging in behaviors in general. In fact, if they are convinced that homosexuality is morally benign and socially, medically, and psychologically healthy behavior, then why do they even bother to use such indirect defenses? Why not just stand on the sanctity of homosexuality itself?

Perhaps it is because they know that homosexuality runs counter to human sexual and domestic design, carries intrinsic health risks, and defies the moral intuitions of the majority of society – it is a losing argument. Homosexuality can only be defended by sheltering it under the umbrella of tolerance and personal autonomy, which arguments such as the "consent" tactic offer the meager hope of providing.

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